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, which received the Phi Beta Kappa Christian Gauss Prize in 1954. A second book, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature (1971) , won the Jam es Russell Lowell Prize in 1972. Professor Abrams has edited a num ber o f m ajor books, m ost notably The Norton Anthology of English Literature, o f which he is both general and Romantic period editor. He is the author o f m any outstanding scholarly essays, am ong them "The C orrespon dent Breeze: A Romantic M etaphor" (1957) , "English Romanticism: The Spirit o f the Age" (1962) , "Structure and Style in the G reater Romantic Lyric" (1965) , "W hat's the Use o f Theorizing about the Arts?" (1972) , "The Deconstructive Angel" (1977) , "How to Do Things W ith Texts" (1979) , and m ost recently, "Kant and the Theology o f A rt" (1981) .
This interview was conducted in Novem ber, 1982, w hen Professor Abrams came to the University o f Iowa to deliver the Ida Beam Lectures in English. The tides o f his lectures were "Art as Such: The Origins o f the M odem Theory o f Literature and the A rts" and "How to Prove an Interpretation." Introducing Professor Abrams, Professor Jo h n E. G rant rem arked on the m onum ental quality o f A bram s's scholarly essays, in which "an extraordi nary range o f reading is brought to bear within a b rief compass to illuminate an image or idea that crystallizes an entire m ode o f thought." The scope, lucidity, and wit that characterize Professor A bram s's writing are no less apparent in his responses to my questions.
SCHOCK: The model o f the four coordinates o f art criticism and their four corresponding kinds o f theoretical perspectives you m apped out in the first chapter o f The Mirror and the Lamp has becom e a considerable heuristic device. Hazard Adams draws on it in Critical Theory Since Plato, and it's also used in writing pedagogy to classify theories about composition. How did you hit on this scheme? Does it derive from anything prior, o r is it original with you?
A b r a m s : It came about by a series o f accidents and circumstances. It is true that the thing is widely used, and I sometimes walk into a classroom in a university where I'm visiting and there it is on the board, m ore or less inaccurately. I d o n 't know what they do with it. I noticed that Lionel Trilling, with all due acknowledgment, uses it in the introduction to his anthology o f literary criticism, which is very flattering. I started working on the critical theory o f the early nineteenth century and quickly got the notion that the basic shift had been from theories o f poetry that talked o f that and the other arts primarily in terms o f imitation, to theories which were what I call "expressive" in that they talk about poetry as the overflow o f feeling, the expression o f feeling, the inward m ade outw ard in a variety o f fashions. I tried to write w hat was then my doctoral thesis in terms o f that basic shift. A num ber o f people who read The Mirror and the Lamp still think that's all I deal with, but it quickly turned out not to apply very well.
For a while I didn't see why, until I noticed, with the help, I think, of some o f the writers in the so-called Chicago school o f criticism, that the eighteenthcentury theorists, though they talked about poetry as imitation, were rather w riting in terms o f poetry's effects on the auditor, according to the H oratian m odel in his Art of Poetry and in the m anner o f the rhetoricians. And when 1 thought about it in those term s it becam e clear that while eighteenthcentury critics talked very often about poetry as imitation, the qualifying clause, almost universal, was that it was an im itation for the purpose o f teaching, pleasing, and/or moving the reader. In other words, these views, to put it crudely, came down to taking the materials o f poetry (and o f the other arts too when, in the eighteenth century, they began to talk about the arts in general-'the fine arts') from experience in the outer world, hum an life in that world, and the objects in that world, but to so alter and order them artistically as to achieve certain prerequisite effects on the reader. Well, that immediately gave m e a third coordinate to deal with: there was the poet who expressed poetry; there was the outer world which was imitated; and there was the audience for w hom you wrote in an effort to move or affect them in certain ways.
Once I'd done that, it becam e clear that a good deal of m odem theoryw hat was then m odem theory-o f the late forties, early fifties, didn't fit any o f those rubrics, and I developed the fourth kind o f theory, which I then called the objective theory, that tries to deal with the poem in isolation from its originating source in the poet or in the world it represents, and to treat it instead as self-bounded and self-sufficient, in term s-theoretically at leasto f its purely internal relationships. So that gave me the complete system, in term s o f which I tried to analyze and classify theories in a preliminary way in that book. T hat doesn't m ean th at's the only way to do it. It is, as you put it well, heuristic; it's a convenient way to do it for my purposes, which were to isolate what was distinctive about Romantic theory, which seemed to me to be the orientation, either sole or primary, to the poet him self in establishing the nature o f poetry and developing criteria o f the poetic kinds and o f value in poetry.
As to w hether it's original with me, who knows? This and that part o f it I picked up from various other writers, such as R.S. Crane and the other Chicago critics.
SCHOCK: -who are called 'neo-Aristotelians,' and it occurred to me that your system resembles Aristotle's four causes: the efficient, final, material and formal. A b r a m s : Well, that's a tough question. W hen it comes to William Blake, anybody who deals with him with high assurance is riding for a fall. It depends where you look at Blake, how you choose to read him; I once gave a lecture called "The Radical Ambiguity o f William Blake," on precisely this kind o f issue. I'll tell you the way I tend to see it. Everybody knows that w hen Blake read some o f W ordsw orth's statem ents about the m ind in relation to Nature, he said it gave him a bellyache from which he almost died, which was his graphic way o f declaring that w hat W ordsw orth said didn't exactly please him. O n the other hand, I think Blake doesn't get angry at som eone who is so widely off the m ark that he just seems to miss it completely. I think when he gets angry it's at people who come pretty close to what h e's doing, but miss it far enough to falsify w hat Blake thinks is the truth o f the case. Blake deals with Nature in a variety o f passages. Sometimes h e's very derogatory: he says, "as for Nature, I d o n 't care about that, it's as the dirt upon my feet." Well, you always have to take Blake in context, you always have to rem em ber w hat the situation is, to w hom h e's talking, how angry he is, and the degree to which h e 's deliberately trying to be outrageous in order to fluster and confuse Crabb Robinson and others.
That aside, I think one o f the m ost revealing ways Blake manages what one could call his metaphysic or his world-view is in terms of fixed vision as against flexible vision, single vision as against what he calls multiple vision, up to a fourfold way o f seeing. It is single vision that yields you Nature in the sense o f a physical world as such. And it isn't that Blake denies that there is single vision or that he claims that single vision is, in a profound sense, illusory: what single vision does is to perceive the thing inadequately or in a way that doesn't reveal all o f its aspects. You rise from that through flexibility o f seeing until you get to the highest m ode o f seeing, in which you apprehend everything as part o f you and you as part o f mankind. All then coheres into one, which Blake represents graphically in his basic myth of the one man, Albion, who falls apart into m ankind in general, the separate sexes, the separate faculties, and the natural world. Now Blake's single vision, if I'm crudely right about this, is coincident with w hat W ordsw orth and Coleridge denounced as the "tyranny o f the eye," that is, as seeing only with the physical eye, which both o f them thought is enorm ously inadequate, and on which Coleridge blam ed all the mistakes of the empiricist philosophy and the school o f Locke, N ew ton's mistakes when he tried to metaphysicize his scientific discoveries and so on. Single vision gives us the world that we see with our senses and nothing more. And W ordsw orth and Coleridge also insisted that poetry doesn't deal with that kind o f reality; it has to deal with the world already altered, transform ed and humanized by imagination, which comes fairly close to what Blake is saying. T hat is, the world o f sense (or Blake's single vision) has been transform ed imaginatively and by the action o f the hum an passions so as to yield us a world fit to live in; and this is the world the poets deal with. The other Romantic poets d o n 't go as far as Blake, but I think what is com m on to m any o f them is the admission o f validity, in some sense, o f the physical world, and o f the fact that we're capable o f seeing the world that way, but also the claim that this is an inadequate way o f seeing, and for Blake, it's a vicious way o f seeing. The need is to transform it by som ething more, and when Coleridge talks about poetry being the "whole soul o f m an in m otion," he m eans in m otion even in the act o f perceiving the outer world, and this corresponds with at least some o f the stages o f Blake's m ovem ent up through the hierarchies o f seeing to the ultim ate vision, that all things are one, that w e're all part o f each other and o f the universe in which we find ourselves.
I think, on the other hand, the attem pt to make all o f these people fall into total coincidence because they happen to live in the same period, and because we attach to them the term 'Rom antic,' is a bad mistake. Yet I also think that to take Blake at his own word, about his total discrepancy from W ordsw orth on these m atters is also to be a little literal-minded.
SCHOCK:
On the basis o f your views in "The Deconstructive Angel," do you think Deconstructionism has a future?
A b r a m s : Yes, it's going to have a future. D errida's so called deconstructive way o f dealing with texts, or "w riting," is a m ode o f linguistic philosophy which tries to reveal the degree to which not only all views o f language hitherto, but also the use o f language itself, incorporate a metaphysical prem ise he calls the existence o f "presence." He assumes that, in order to be determ inately meaningful, language requires an absolute ground in pres ence, but also that such a ground does not exist. As a consequence o f this lack, he claims, language dissipates into "indeterm inacy" and "undecida bility." W hat has happened in America is that the American critics have taken what is primarily a metaphysical, or philosophical view, and converted it into a m ethod o f practical criticism, by continuing the strong strain in America o f the New Critical approach to the explication o f literary works, one by one. The New Criticism is widely derogated now, but we continue to deal with literature in term s o f close reading and the close explication o f single texts. And what they've d one-people like de Man and Hillis Miller and others-is to apply the principle o f deconstructive metaphysics to a New Critical attention to the text o f a poem as such, by dem onstrating the way that the text o f any poem whatever, if you read it according to their p rem ises, proceeds to deconstruct itself by "dissem inating," to use one o f D er rida's terms, its apparently stable m eanings into an indefinite range o f meanings which inescapably involve self-contradiction. Now the shortcom ing o f that, as a m ethod o f criticism, is revealed by its fruits, and that is, it's terribly boring: you find that all poems ultimately say one thing and one thing only, and that is, that they can't say anything decisively or determinately. After yo u 've read deconstructive criticism ap plied to some poems, novels, or other works o f literature, you quickly begin to anticipate that th at's w hat you're going to find the next time a deconstruc tive critic turns his attention to another work. The only rem aining interest lies in the discovery o f "how 's he going to do it this tim e" ? "W here's he going to start this tim e"? "W here's he going to find w hat Hillis Miller calls the 'loose thread,' which he pulls on, and so unravels the whole thing"? So I d o n 't see how deconstructive criticism can possibly survive in that radical form, if only because it's so utterly m onotonous-to find all poem s saying the same thing, which is, in effect, that they can say nothing, or nothing determ inate.
But o f course Deconstruction has a future. It's going to leave a m ark on criticism. The kind o f readings deconstructive critics do-especially the analysis o f the rhetorical and figurative play in a text-is bound to affect the way others o f us read and talk about texts, even though we stop short o f the ultimate dissemination o f the text. I think the same thing will happen to Deconstruction that has happened to earlier new m ovem ents in criticism, after a brief heyday in which each m ovem ent achieves a vogue as a radical alternative to traditional criticism. But traditional criticism remorselessly moves on, assimilates some o f the new insights, and continues without radical shift in its m ode or m om entum . Some o f the discoveries and proce dures o f Deconstruction will becom e assimilated into the traditional m ode o f reading-that is, reading on the assum ption that an author undertook to say something determ inate, and that our inherited practice o f the language is close enough to that o f the author to yield us adequate assurance that the core o f meanings that we interpret approxim ate what the author undertook to say by the sentences in his text.
SCHOCK: W ho were your teachers in Romantic studies and in criticism, and how did you get started studying criticism and literary theory?
A b r a m s : Well, I really did very little formal work at college in the Rom an tic period. I rem em ber as an undergraduate taking a course in English Romantic Poetry from John Livingstone Lowes, who unfortunately was past his prim e at the time, but still an eloquent and persuasive lecturer. But his line w asn't particularly the one I took in my graduate period, though my undergraduate essay that was published as The Milk of Paradise obviously did get quite a lot from Lowes; I think I m entioned him a couple o f times in the course o f it. That book later becam e notorious, if not famous, despite itself. It was published in about three hundred fifty copies, and disappeared from sight until the drug culture o f the 1960s and 70s suddenly made people think o f it as an avant-garde book, and it was reprinted by three separate publish ers-two paperback publishers and one hardcover publisher, I believe-in a single year. I turned out to have been riding the wave o f the future! I only let them reprint it, however, with the proviso that they allow me to write a new preface for it, in which I disowned sym pathy with the current drug culture, and pointed out that whatever truth there might have been in my notion that some m ajor poets and prose writers got materials from their opium reveries, they all insisted on the horrible cost o f this kind o f addiction. N obody insisted m ore strongly than Coleridge and DeQuincey on the cost o f becom ing a drug addict, in the loss o f m oral capacity, the destruction of character, and the destruction, eventually, even o f the imaginative power. As a graduate student at H arvard I took a sem inar with Theodore Spen cer, who died, unfortunately, young, and who was himself a poet, wrote a good book on Shakespeare, and was very much interested in m odem poet ry. He happened to teach a sem inar that I took, I think my first year in graduate school, on English literature in the decade o f the 1830s. At that time a couple o f books had come out which dealt with a single decade of English Literature in the nineteenth century. T hat interested him, and he organized his sem inar in that way. Well, the fact was, in the 1830s, nothing m uch was happening in literature. It was the end either o f the lives, or of the productive periods, o f the great English Romantic poets. Coleridge survived for a while, and W ordsw orth lived through and beyond that period, but stopped doing anything o f great account in poetry, and the others were dead. Tennyson had just begun to publish; Arnold h adn't been published, as I recall. In lieu o f m ajor poets, we started to work with people like Thom as Campbell, Samuel Rogers, and other poets o f that quality-including Robert M ontgomery, who wrote awful epics; one o f them was called Satan. "Satan M ontgom ery" he was him self nam ed after his success at that time.
So perforce I turned my attention to criticism; I wrote my report-an inordinately long seminar paper-on the critical theory of that time. I think that led to my picking it up as the topic for m y Ph.D. thesis, also under the sponsorship o f Theodore Spencer, though I d o n 't believe he read m ore than two or three chapters o f the work. It was very laissez-faire, catch-as-catch-can in some m entor-student relationships in the graduate schools o f those days, at least at Harvard. Some teachers kept a tight grip on their students' work; others let them have their heads. Ted let me have my head, so I did pretty much what I wanted.
Well, I wrote lots of chapters and then threw them away, I read m ore and m ore and thought m ore and m ore, and finally wrote a very long thesis, inordinately long-I'd never accept anything o f that length from one o f my students-which dealt with the Romantic theory o f poetry and the theory o f criticism too. The theory o f poetry I at that time tried to deal with in terms o f expression versus imitation solely; later, as I've already said, I greatly complicated that scheme. But the theory o f criticism itself which dealt with questions such as "is there a standard of taste?" I dropped out o f the book; and eventually, after thirteen years o f hard but not irremissive work, I finished The Mirror and the Lamp. The book has the same title as the original thesis. An amusing thing is that one o f my graduate students was travelling in England, and gleefully found and mailed to me, as a present, a very bad novel, published, I believe, in the 1910s, A b r a m s: Through influence, but w ithout anxiety. You pick up som ething that som ebody else has done, you find it illuminating, and without making any deliberate decision about it, you continue to work with it because you continue to find it revealing. W hat happened was that I was in England for a year right after getting my A.B., on a fellowship to Cambridge University, and went there to work with I.A . Richards-that was the year before he finally came to America. He was then interested in Locke and Coleridge, and was engaged in finishing the book that came out very soon thereafter, called W hat Ogden had pulled out o f Bentham was his analysis o f the role that fictions play in legal and moral terminology, and to Bentham this was a purely deceptive role. Bentham was still in the tradition o f Locke, which distrusts metaphors, and looks for literal language as the only way to approxim ate the truth. But quite apart from that, his basic procedure was to show in the terminology that is central to law and morals, that the Latin roots are radically metaphorical. The word 'obligation,' for example, goes back to a root m eaning "tied to," and there are lots of examples like that. Nowadays this doesn't seem any great discovery; o f course the Deconstruc tionists make much o f the fact that there is no literal language-all language turns out to be metaphorical. But in Bentham 's day it was thought that there was literal language as well as metaphorical language. But a lot o f the m etaphors are dead, and so dead that you have to know the Latin in order to unravel the literal root-meanings that have been transferred to the m eta phorical m oral or legislative sense.
I kept thinking about things in terms o f m etaphors, and then finally began working on the critical theory o f the early nineteenth century. It didn't require much discernment to recognize that the m irror played a constant, reiterative, and explicit role in much imitation theory. Literature is a m irror held up to life; Shakespeare, says Johnson for example, holds the m irror up to life in his dramas. And as for expressive theory-the word expression itself means "to press out," and so turns to the poet as the source for the materials o f his work rather than to the world which is said to be mirrored, reflected, represented, and so on. I saw that both o f those theories involved m etaphors or metaphoric analogues, such as m irrors and lamps, and it began to be clear that m etaphors played a key role in other kinds o f theories, some of them in a way that isn't revealed specifically by my coordinates. Take, for exam ple, organic theory, which I deal with at some length in The Mirror and the Lamp. It's no great discovery to find that organic theory takes terms which apply literally (at least in quotation marks "literally") to a growing plant and the achieved status o f the full-grown plant, and tries to deal with the operant processes o f the hum an mind and with the products of mind, including art, in terms which are literal for a plant, and transferred, or metaphorical, for a work o f art or a poem.
I kept pursuing that, and I had basically written The Mirror and the Lamp, when I came across a book which may have been published earlier-but I think not, I think it hadn't come out then-by the philosopher Stephen Pepper, which was called Root Metaphors. His So all o f these things are partly accident and what you happen to be reading, and partly preconditioned, in that it resonates with what you bring to w hat you're reading. The direction you take seems to be a result o f those two forces together. A b r a m s : I think W asserm an was riding a hobbyhorse in trying to divest Shelley o f Platonism. And I think the bias is an opposite overreaction to the overemphasis on Shelley as a Platonist-that book by Notopoulos, which makes Shelley out to be nothing else but an out-and-out Platonic theorist. The usual way in such m atters is to oppose one extrem e by being equally radical on the other extrem e, and being no m ore right.
But what W asserman does say that I agree with, as I recall, in his critique o f what I did with Shelley's critical theory, is that I had distorted Shelley's views by trying to make them fit into my paradigm o f Romantic expressive theories. That charge, I think, is true. If I were writing the book now, I w ouldn't deal with Shelley as I did then. I think I did him an injustice, because my view then was that good or valid poetic theories are not som e how true to the essence o f poetry o r art, but rather are heuristic devices, speculative instrum ents, which should be judged by the degree to which they illuminate aspects of a poem, its organization, effects and so on, that other wise we d o n 't see, or d o n 't see nearly so clearly. From that point o f view I didn't see much heuristic value in Shelley's Defence of Poetry, and I tried to m ake it fit my preordained frame, which in that instance became a sort of Procrustes bed. I probably had to lop Shelley's theory off in a variety of ways.
And that was the w rong way to read Shelley; his is not a defense o f poetry in terms o f proposing a theory that would be useful in practical criticism; instead, it's a defense o f poetry in term s o f its continuing and indispensable value in hum an life as a product o f the imagination, rather than o f the rational elem ent in man. And as such, Shelley's essay is one o f the great, eloquent, and perm anent statem ents o f the value o f poetry, written from the perspective through which he looked at poetry; that is, the whole family of great poets constitute a true family, and recurrently deal with the same paradigms, the same essential hum an concerns. It's an indispensable state m ent o f the hum ane, enduring value o f poetry, done in terms o f Shelley's elected frame o f reference. Yes, I did do Shelley an injustice. I was aware o f that fact, even before W asserm an m ade it patent to me that my suspicion that I'd been unjust to Shelley was well-grounded. I think that is the one part o f The Mirror and the Lamp (it's not a very large part, actually, the part in which I deal with Shelley's Defence) that I w ouldn't be willing to stand by today. The rest, as far as I know, I'd still be willing to say, though perhaps with different emphases. A b r a m s : W hat I'd like to do is take the very condensed lecture that I gave yesterday about art as such, the social conditions in the eighteenth century which fostered that theory o f art, and the intellectual origins o f its concepts, and expand it into a series o f three or four lectures, for which I would for once be able to use slides. I'd love to have the advantage of my colleagues in the history o f fine arts, who always show slides; no m atter how boring the lecture is, the slides can be absorbing. I'd like to use slides, and then make the lectures into a short book. All m y life I've had it as my ambition to write a short book, but they always get long. The trouble is that I'm repeatedly led astray by getting interested and involved with m odem critical movements, and with w hat I w ant to say about those movements. Also, I have a couple o f textbooks which sell so well that one can't afford to let them get out o f date: A Glossary of Literary Terms and The Norton Anthology of English Literature, o f which I'm general editor and a period editor as well. Those books need periodic revision, and each time you revise one it takes a good part o f a year, or sometimes m ore. You've got a tiger by the tail-you can't afford to let it go, and it pre-empts a large portion of your working time. And I also get draw n into other activities. I've been sitting on a variety o f national organizations and committees, one o f the standard penalties o f growing old in the profession. So I'm constantly being deflected. I've been saying for three or four years that I'm going to do this expansion o f my lecture, but I'm still stuck with a single lecture-the one I gave yesterday is a revised version o f a paper I've had sitting around for at least three years, m aybe more. Anyway, that's the thing I'd like m ost to do while I still can: the expansion o f that lecture, with lots m ore detail about what happened during the eighteenth century to each o f w hat only then came to be classified together as 'the fine arts.' SCHOCK: W hen asked how he viewed his place in the contem porary fiction scene, Vladimir Nabokov once replied that it looked "jolly good from up here." How do you see your contribution to criticism and to literary theory?
A b r a m s : Well, when I was an undergraduate, I was studying Goethe, and I rem em ber being struck by som ething he said at the age o f twenty-five: "schon funf-und-zwanzig Jah re und noch nichts fur Ewigkeit gem acht" ("al ready twenty-five years old, and still nothing done for eternity"). I said, "the arrogance o f that man, but I adm ire it." And there were books that were still being read when I was an undergraduate that had been w ritten almost a century before-in intellectual history, books like Leslie Stephen's English Thought in the Eighteenth Century. And I developed an ambition, not to write som ething for eternity, but to write som ething that I hoped people would want to read fifty years after it was published. And so I set to work with great care on a book. I rem em ber D ante said that his Divine Comedy "kept me thin for ten years." Well, The Mirror and the Lamp kept me thin for longer-o f course the war intervened and knocked three or four years out o f the middle o f that span, but certainly no less than ten years-and with a result, I'm forced to admit, that is som ew hat below that o f Dante. I later worked just as hard, perhaps even longer, on Natural Supernaturalism. I d o n 't care how my contribution to criticism and literary theory will stack up under the aspect o f eternity, but I do hope I've w ritten a couple o f books that som e body or other may still be reading fifty years from now. T hat's the extent o f my ambition.
SCHOCK: I'd say you'll reach it.
A b r a m s : I suddenly realize w e're not that far from fifty years after The Mirror and the Lamp came out in 1953. 2003 will m ark its fiftieth anniversary. I doubt that I'll be here to judge w hether it's still being read, but you keep it in mind. You'll be around, so you ask, "anybody ever hear o f a book called The Mirror and the LampT' M aybe som eone will answer: "Oh, yes; isn't that the tide o f a novel published about 150 years ago?"
